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ABSTRACT 
The economic concept of rationality seems inappropriate in the context of creative 
innovation, because of its assumption that the tastes and preferences of agents are fixed. 
The concept of copying, of imitating the behaviour of others, has equal claim to the 
description 'rational' in an innovative context. Models of ‘binary choices with 
externalities’ are predicated on copying and potentially show us not only why most 
innovations fail, but also why big social changes do not necessarily require big causes. In 
the ‘Long-tail’ world of a huge range of choice, however, many choices are not ‘binary, 
either-or’. In the long-tail world, popular choices tend to become more popular, but not 
forever, as innovation drives a constant turnover in the popularity rankings. A very 
simple model of ‘neutral’ copying with occasional originality of choice can explain real-
world patterns of long-tail distributions under continual turnover. 
 
 
Introduction 
Cultural science should seek an evolutionary understanding of a knowledge-based society 
past and present, with one of its goals being to map possible future scenarios to which 
public policy and businesses must adapt. Identifying what proceeds in predictable 
directions, as opposed to drifting upon the tides of fashion, would be of great utility in 
understanding the evolution of creative innovation. 
 
Seemingly an oxymoron, ‘cultural science’ is inherently interdisciplinary. An important 
issue in cultural science remains an old one: the relationship of formal quantitative 
modelling to more descriptive, domain-specific knowledge. Alfred Marshall, who helped 
develop the Department of Economics at Cambridge in the 19th century (and had obtained 
the second best maths result at Cambridge in his final exams) advised us to “Use 
mathematics as shorthand language, rather than as an engine of inquiry,” followed by 
these steps  
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• Keep to them till you have done.  
• Translate into English.  
• Then illustrate by examples that are important in real life  
• Burn the mathematics.  
• If you can’t succeed in 4, burn 3. This I do often.’ 
 
Marshall’s views can be applied more generally to maths and the social sciences as a 
whole; if formal modelling is used to complement domain-specific knowledge, then the 
two together can gain more insight than either taken on its own. Modelling is helpful in 
describing the key features of a problem. In the social sciences, however, the parameters 
and features of the model, once identified, need then to be capable of being accounted for 
by plausible arguments. 
 
As an example of this interdisciplinarity, we focus on describing a particular category of 
modelling, namely representing the diffusion of behaviour across social networks. Our use 
of the term ‘behaviour’ refers to a wide range, from choice in consumer goods markets to 
the spread of much more abstract concepts such as cultural norms and trust. Although it 
has a long history (e.g. Tarde 1895), the metaphor of ideas spreading through ‘contagion’ 
or diffusion has become commonplace in the modern world of viral marketing and rapid 
spread of global trends and fashions. Malcolm Gladwell (2000) published a bestseller based 
on this premise, and fittingly, the metaphor itself has spread and become popular in 
academia. Richardson (2000), for example, significantly influenced public policy literature 
by describing ideas spreading as a ‘policy virus’.  
 
 
How agents choose 
 
Rational choice in economic theory 
 
Since Marshall’s time, most quantitative social science has used a standard assumption that 
human decisions are routinely made by individual, rational economic agents. Agents are 
postulated to operate as autonomous individuals, each with his or her fixed set of tastes 
and preferences. The agent gathers all available information relevant to a particular 
decision, and then processes it so as to make the best possible choice – the ‘optimal’ one – 
within its fixed set of tastes and preferences.  
 
In certain specific contexts, the pure rational agent model gives a good understanding of 
the world. For example, electronic supermarket sales data show that relative prices are a 
very important determinant of brand choice, as the rational choice model suggests. Here 
the assumption of fixed tastes and preferences (for price) seems a reasonable 
approximation to reality. The consumer has already decided to spend rather than save, has 
already decided to buy food in a supermarket rather than, say, a meal in a restaurant, 
preferences on different brands of breakfast cereal or whatever are already formed. 
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Further, the information to be processed in buying cereal or soap is relatively constrained, 
and easily rectified if the wrong decision is made. 
 
The concept of bounded rationality (Akerlof 1970) extends the empirical validity of this 
model considerably. In relaxing the assumption of complete information, bounded 
rationality can lead to different outcomes, even as agents are still assumed to make the 
best possible decision (given their fixed tastes and preferences) from limited information, 
with different groups of agents possibly having different information. An example that 
Akerlof gave is the market for second hand cars, where sellers typically possesses more 
information than buyers about the vehicles.  
 
Copying 
 
The economic concept of rationality, however, even bounded rationality, seems ill-suited 
to issues of creative innovation. Fixed tastes and preferences is not the obvious model for 
situations in which tastes and preferences necessarily evolve, as agents are confronted 
with innovations. Culture, by definition as a shared set of ideas and practices, cannot arise 
through autonomous, rational agents. In other words, the assumed world of autonomous 
individuals, each with his or her fixed set of tastes and preferences, could be seen as quite 
contrary to common experience and even the very nature of culture itself.  
 
In popular culture, the thought of ideas spreading through social diffusion is entirely 
commonplace, and modern English is filled with phrases describing ideas that “spread like 
wildfire” or rumours getting round, or the changes to a story as it spreads via “Chinese 
whispers’. Copying is so normal that great 19th novels were often set amidst ‘society’ so 
stifling that a protagonist’s struggle for originality was sufficient to drive the narrative, for 
Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky, for example. Even before writing existed, human knowledge 
was copied; through oral traditions, parenting, and craft apprenticeships.  
 
An alternative is a completely different ‘null model' of rationality, where agents rely 
primarily on copying other agents. In the simplest form of a copying model, agents pay no 
attention to the objective properties of the various choices available. Instead they simply 
copy the behaviour of others, according to a variety of possible rules (Laland 2004). A 
classic illustration of the operation of this postulate in practice is given by the conformity 
experiments of Solomon Asch (1953). The behaviour of an agent tends to become more 
similar to the group of which he or she is a member. This could happen, for example, 
because the agent believes the group to have better information than he or she does, or 
from a simple desire to conform to group norms (Boyd et al. 2010, 2011). In other 
contexts, peer acceptance can be the behavioural motivation by which agents become 
more similar to their peers. Obesity, for example, has spread not just due to modern fatty 
diets but through social diffusion as well (Christakis and Fowler 2007), and binge drinking 
similarly has a strong social network component (Ormerod and Wiltshire 2009). 
We agree with Rendell et al. (2010: 208) that copying – or ‘social learning’ – is 
‘widespread in nature and is central to the remarkable success of humanity, yet it remains 
unclear why copying is profitable and how to copy most effectively’. They organised a 
computer tournament in which entrants submitted strategies specifying how to use social 
learning and other alternatives to acquire adaptive behaviour in a complex environment. 
While many predicted the winning strategy to be some ideal combination of in individual 
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and social learning, it turned out that the ‘winning strategy relied nearly exclusively on 
social learning’. 
 
We should be careful, however, not to shift to the opposite pole of thinking, and 
automatically attribute all outcomes in modern communications contexts to the process of 
copying. For example, in analysing a global instant messaging network of 27.4 million 
users for longitudinal, demographic, and geographic patterns, Aral et al. (2009) argued 
that community similarity of behaviour can be attributed more to homophily -- the 
tendency for people with similar interests to wind up in the same group or space -- than 
to contagion. 
 
Nevertheless, models for creative innovation that emphasize copying are likely to prove 
more powerful than those which rely on agent rationality. Rational behaviour postulates 
that tastes and preferences are fixed which cannot explain cultural differences, i.e., 
endogenous tastes and preferences that contrast between groups (e.g., Potts et. al. 2008). 
 
Binary choice with externalities 
 
Thomas Schelling (1973) proposed a classic model in which dramatic segregation of 
groups could follow from agents faced a binary choice with only very weak biases of their 
own. Since then, binary choice models have been given wide application. Binary choice 
simply means an agent adopts a behaviour or not, as in voting for candidate A or someone 
else, choosing a particular restaurant or rejecting it; believing or not that stock prices will 
go up. Schelling’s crucial advance was to show that the decision of any given agent may 
alter the choice made by other agents – the decisions have ‘externalities’. All subsequent 
models, of ‘binary choice with externalities,’ invoke some process of copying. Agents are 
often connected on some form of network, and any given agent is aware of the choices of 
those agents to which he or she is connected (the relevant peer group). 
 
Duncan Watts (2002), who is now Director of the Human Social Dynamics group at 
yahoo.com, made elegant use of this model category. Watts (2002) reasonably assumed 
that agents will differ in their willingness to be persuaded to adopt (copy) a different 
mode of behaviour from their neighbours. Each agent is allocated a ‘threshold’ that 
represents the proportion of other agent it pays attention to who must adopt the 
behaviour before it does as well. So if an agent pays attention to five others, and has a 
threshold of 10%, then it only needs one of the five (= 20%) to choose the alternative for 
the agent to copy this behaviour. If the agent had a threshold above 80%, however, it 
would not adopt the behaviour until all five of the others had (Watts 2002). Watts (2002) 
assigned these thresholds to agents randomly, from a uniform distribution ranging from 0 
to 100% (In a practical situation, of course, we might estimate this range more precisely, 
through survey evidence on their persuadability, for example).  
 
Despite its apparent simplicity, the Watts (2002) model lends two powerful insights into 
how creative innovation spreads across any given population.  
• Most innovations fail. Watts (2002) found that most agent decisions did 
not cascade very far among the other agents. This fits real-world evidence 
(Ormerod 2005). 
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• Big effects do not require big causes. Small initial disturbances of identical 
size can have dramatically different consequences. 
 
We illustrate the second point as follows. We populate the Watts (2002) model with 1,000 
agents, connected on a ‘small world’ network (Watts and Strogatz 1998) – although 
similar results random or scale-free networks yield similar results. Each agent can be in 
one of two states of the world, A or B. Initially all agents are in state A, with their 
thresholds drawn uniformly in the range 0 to 100%. A small number of agents, in this case 
20, is selected at random to choose B not A. We then allow the model to run and observe 
the total number of agents which eventually switch to B. We call this number, as a 
proportion of the total number of agents (1,000), the ‘size of the cascade’. By running the 
model repeatedly many times, and each time choose the seeds at random, and plot the 
resulting distribution of the size of the cascade. The result in Figure 1 shows that the 
percentage that switches to B from A is most of the time considerably less than 100%. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Cascade size in Watts (2002) model with 1,000 agents with heterogeneous thresholds, 20 
agents selected at random as the initial seeds 
 
In cases involving ‘either/or’ decisions, such models of ‘binary choice with externalities’ 
yield many insights, in cases such as voting (Galam 2007). Voting in a referendum, for 
example, typically involves a huge range of factors to be considered, often enormously 
complicated, but the choice in a referendum is nevertheless usually a simple binary one: 
yes or no.  
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The Long Tail world 
 
Despite Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard’s best efforts to suggest so, not all decisions 
in modern life are Either-Or. We now consider cases where agents choose between many 
alternatives. In the modern, ‘long-tail’ world (Anderson 2006), people in market 
economies are faced with of orders of magnitude more choice than previous centuries and 
millennia (Beinhocker 2006; Ridley 2010). There can be such an overwhelming number of 
similar consumer items, expert opinions, popular ideas, and other choices that a well-
informed, ‘rational’ decision becomes impossible. Even a particular field of academic 
research may be characterised by thousands or even tens of thousands of relevant articles. 
Many of modern choices come from long tail distributions (Anderson 2006) – with some 
extremely popular choices of ‘blockbuster’ proportions and the majority of other ideas 
relatively unpopular, out in the long tail.  
 
In these cases, there is a particular way of characterising the degree of choice, which 
Shannon (1948), among the founders of Information Theory, proposed to measure 
information content. Shannon’s measure is a way of measuring the average information 
content of each different item of choice, where information is measured in bits, as for a 
computer. Shannon (1951) estimated, for example, that the English language has an 
average information content of just over 9 bits per word. The idea is that each word helps 
clarify the sentence by this amount of information. Of course, as George Orwell (1946) 
pointed out adamantly, people tend to copy “long strips of words” from each other as 
ready-made clichés, and so the information content of each word gets reduced because so 
often the missing word is quite predictable. For example, if someone is heard to say “we 
need a … nuanced understanding of…” it is about 99% certain that the missing word was 
“more” not “less” (compare Google search results for these two different exact phrases). 
Hence, Shannon (1951) estimated that that the entropy of English was reduced to only 4.5 
bits per word when the 100 letters of the proceeding message was already known.  
 
Shannon’s entropy measure gives us some quantitative measure of how drastically choice 
has increased in the last several decades. By applying this measure to baby names, for 
example, we find that in 1960 the information entropy for the range of first names given 
to baby girls was about 8.5, whereas in 2009 it was over 10. This may not seem like much, 
but the difference is actually logarithmic – about a threefold increase in this dimension of 
choice. For another example, we can consider case studies of word usage in particular 
niches of social science and physical science (Bentley 2008) and find that the physical 
science journal niche (all articles who have cited Barabási and Albert 1999) has an 
information entropy of about 8.8, whereas in the social science niche (all articles that 
have cited Bordieu 1977) it is 11.3. This implies that the usage of words in the physical 
sciences is more predictable – to the social scientists, who use language more liberally, this 
might mean ‘dull’, whereas the physicists might say that they are using words to refer 
consistently to specific phenomena rather than invent new words to say the same thing. 
In any case, those working in the social sciences could be said to have a fivefold greater 
range of terminology (or jargon) to choose from. 
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Many alternatives and copying 
 
In such cases of ‘choice overload’ a good strategy is often to copy others. Among a range of 
animal groups, from humans to other primates and even fish, copying is a highly effective, 
time-saving strategy for learning the best way to behave in a given situation (Laland 
2004). Conformity, which Solomon Asch (op.cit.), Stanley Milgram (1963) and other 
social scientists demonstrated so effectively, is copying biased towards the most popular 
behaviour. Copying what others do works for individuals, because it gives a good chance 
for group acceptance, and it also works for groups, because it yields group cohesion and 
coordinated activity (Couzin et al. 2005; Boyd et al. 2010, 2011).  
The advantages of copying have been largely missed by game theory, which has most 
often considered agents as being paired off in ‘prisoners dilemma’ games. For large 
interactive populations, however, copying is often the most effective strategy. This was 
shown in a recent high-profile tournament of simulated strategies in competition, agents 
could act independently or copy other agents after observing their levels of success 
(Rendell et al. 2010). The tournament demonstrated how copying recent, successful 
strategies of others is highly adaptive in an environment of a large range of choice that is 
continually changing. 
 
Of course, there will be a huge range of idiosyncratic, personal reasons people might have 
for copying. The marketing scientist Andrew Ehrenberg and colleagues (Goodhardt et al. 
1984) developed a classic model — termed a “Dirichlet” in honour of the nineteenth-
century German mathematician — in which it was assumed that consumers had no 
inherent brand preference and made choices based on chance and availability. It is thus 
not a great stretch to assume that people might copy in the same undirected way.  
 
Copying others yields a natural ‘rich-get-richer’ effect, because the more common 
something it is, the more likely it is to be copied – even more so if conformity is a social 
norm. Modelling this ‘rich-get-richer’ effect can be traced back to Yule (1925), who 
applied it to the number of species per genus of flowering plants. Simon (1955) applied the 
approach in the social sciences, examining for example the size distribution of cities or of 
corporations. 
 
The key concept underlying this approach - ‘preferential attachment’ is the modern 
description - is that an agent copies the choices previously made by other agents with a 
probability which is proportionate to the number of times each of these choices has been 
selected. So, purely for example, suppose A has been chosen by 50 agents, B by 30 agents 
and C by 20 agents, then the next agent making a choice will select A with a probability 
of 50%, B with one of 30%, and C with one of 20%. 
 
As a behavioural rule it has intuitive plausibility. If choice is a difficult problem (too many 
alternatives or just inherently complicated, etc.), it seems reasonable that an agent will 
select in proportion to the relative popularity of the alternatives. Ormerod and Roach 
(2008) give the example of religious choice in England in the middle of the 16th century, 
showing how this simple model gives results which are compatible with the 
contemporary historical documentary evidence. 
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The ‘preferential attachment’ concept was essentially rediscovered by Barabási and Albert 
(1999) in a paper which has become widely cited (over 5,000 citations already), especially 
by physicists, who have taken an interest in problems in the social sciences. When the 
model is populated by a large number of agents, the statistical distribution of the relative 
popularity of the various choices converges on a long-tail distribution, which is highly 
non-Gaussian. A small number of alternatives is selected by many agents, whilst most 
alternatives attract few choices. There is a substantial and arcane literature on whether 
empirically observed distributions are best approximated by a particular long-tailed 
function, a power law, or by some other non-Gaussian distribution (e.g. Laherrère and 
Sornette 1998; Newman 2005; Mitzenmacher 2008). But for social scientists, it is much 
more important to know that a distribution is non-Gaussian than it is to make a fetish of 
the power law, a distribution which in the social sciences has no special significance. 
 
 
The 'neutral' model of cultural evolution 
 
Creative expression relies on social contexts, and symbolic information depends not just 
on what a style is, but also who adopts it. In the Internet age, this is increasingly 
envisaged as networks, with the creative outputs (Web pages, videos, academic 
publications, etc.) as ‘nodes’, and their interactive influences (cited references, related 
Web pages) as ‘links’ (e.g., 15, 24) . Since the late 1990s, researchers, particularly in 
physics, have applied generalised network analysis toward a range of creative media 
(Guimerà et al. 2005; Newman 2010; Christakis and Fowler 2009). 
 
Most of these network models invoke some form of a preferential attachment process. 
Preferential attachment models can fit long-tailed distributions of popularity, but the 
problem is that these models do not naturally generate any turnover in the rankings of 
popularity which emerge amongst the various choices. Once a sufficient number of agents 
is in the model, the most popular choice remains the most popular, the second remains 
number two, and so on. There are various developments of the basic model to try to 
rectify this problem, but they essentially involve rather artificial add-ons, such as the 
additional assumption that the probability of the choice itself diminishes with its age (e.g., 
Dorogovtsev and Mendes 2000; Hajra and Sen 2006). 
 
In a good model, change should be part of the essence of the process, rather than just a 
modification. Change, in fact, is central to evolutionary theory, which is strictly the study 
of how attributes are passed on and modified through time (22). Evolutionary approaches 
to culture change (20, 22) have included tools from epidemiology (11, 27, 31), network 
theory (15, 23, 24) and population genetics (1-9, 13).  
 
The key, however, to modelling cultural innovation, lies in the transmission process being 
essentially one of copying what others do (Mesoudi and Whiten 2008), with creative 
modifications contributing new ideas that eventually replace old ones through being 
copied. For this reason a remarkably powerful evolutionary approach allows agents to 
either copy in relative proportion to popularity, but also allows each agent the option to 
invent something unique, or to select something which no previous agent has chosen. 
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Formally, an agent innovates with probability µ and chooses according to preferential 
attachment with probability (1-µ). 
 
This apparently simple addition makes a dramatic difference to the properties of the 
model, and in particular turnover in rankings is an inherent and natural feature of the 
approach. Borrowing from evolutionary biology, it is also known as the 'neutral' model 
(Neiman 1995; Shennan and Wilkinson 2001) because when operating according to 
preferential attachment, an agent is indifferent – 'neutral' - to the inherent qualities of the 
choice which he or she is copying. All that matters is the relative popularity of the choice.  
 
With the neutral model, a rich-get-richer effect occurs, but is not a fixed rule under the 
undirected copying model, which is characterised by unpredictability and continual flux 
in the most popular ideas. This turnover and flux reflects real world data, such as the 
constant rising and falling of cites ranked according to population size (Batty 2006) 
academic buzzword use (Bentley 2008), dog breed popularity (Herzog et al. 2004), and 
even birdsongs (Byers et al. 2010). This turnover is often remarkably regular and the 
model predicts it will be proportional to the square root of the modelled fraction of 
inventors, but it does not correlate strongly, as one might expect, with population size 
(Bentley et al. 2007).  
 
A subtle assumption underlying this model, and that of that of simple preferential 
attachment, is that all previous choices which have been made are taken into account 
when any given agent makes a choice. Whilst this may be a reasonable approximation to 
reality in situations where long memory is important, such as in decisions by firms to 
locate in a particular city, it is clearly much less valid in, say, popular culture such as the 
downloads on YouTube or Flickr. 
 
Bentley et al. (2011) generalise this neutral copying model by introducing a second 
parameter, that of 'memory'. This specifies how far back previous choices are taken into 
account at any point in time. It explicitly allows for the extinction of any given choice if 
no agent has selected it during the number of previous steps specified by the memory 
parameter. Under this generalisation of the copying model, turnover results from a 
balance of the introduction of new ideas by the specified minority fraction of innovators, 
and extinction, through failing to be copied by any agents among the copying majority.  
 
This generalised neutral copying model, despite its parsimonious structure with only two 
parameters, is surprisingly powerful. It can replicates population-scale patterns one finds 
in real data — long tailed distributions that undergo continual flux, and unpredictability 
in what particular idea becomes highly popular . Through the process, most newly 
invented ideas fail, and only a few lucky ones become inordinately popular. The model 
can fit almost perfectly the long tail of baby-name popularity, for example.  
 
The extra memory parameter provides flexibility in the results, such that the model can 
replicate the long tailed distributions of a range of forms to match a variety of real-world 
data sets (Bentley et al. 2011). Figure 2 illustrates the calibration of the model to a range of 
data sets, in how the neutral model can fit both the distributions of popularity (Figure 2a), 
as well as the finite lifespans of the choices among the ‘most popular’ rankings (Figure 2b). 
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The modified neutral model (Bentley et al. 2011) is specifically designed to model the 
effect of different innovation rates, in ways that are testable against real-world data. The 
results shed light on the role of innovation in the acceleration of cultural change and open 
the door of the humanities to the dynamic science of evolution. The data needed are all 
realistically obtainable, as they consist of the frequencies (relative popularities) across the 
range of choices - be they fashion designs, trendy buzzwords, music choices, or other 
ideas - and how those frequencies changed through time for each of the possible choices.  
 
 
 
Figure 2 (a, b) 
Figure 2. (a) Rank versus popularity for real-world top 100 ranked lists (dots) versus neutral 
model results (lines). Top 100 lists include: male baby name frequency (per million) in the 1990 
US census (blue), RSS feed subscriptions 2001-2008 (orange), English words (red), cited 
economists 1993-2003 (purple), and religions in thousands of adherents (green). (b) Life-spans 
of UK Number One Hits (www.theofficialcharts.com) for 1956-2007 (open circles), versus the 
neutral model (m = 1, µ = 0.1) shown by the blue line), and also years in the Top 5 US boys' 
names (www.ssa.gov/OACT/babynames), 1907-2006 (filled circles) versus the neutral model (m 
= 10, µ = 0.001), shown by the red line. Adapted from Bentley et al. 2011: Figs 2b and 4b. 
 
Specifically, the data needed to apply the model include the (a) frequency distributions 
(how popularity is distributed among a variety of choices), (b) record of popularity of each 
individual choice through time and (c) record of the turnover in the most popular variants 
over time. Each of these measures carries a different prediction under different levels of 
copying versus independent choice-making (or original invention). As a result, the neutral 
model can help to characterize different realms of creative media along a ‘spectrum’ 
between general and selective copying, as well as provide estimates of innovation rates in 
each medium (Bentley et al. 2011).  
 
The scale of analysis is a key variable (O’Brien and Lyman 2002). For example, while 
choices of baby names at the scale of the entire United States are indistinguishable from 
neutral copying (Hahn and Bentley 2003), different ethnic groups select from different 
pools of names (Leiberson 2000; Freyer and Levitt 2004), yet within each group, random 
drift could predominate again (which remains to be studied). Similarly, prehistoric pottery 
designs may constitute a selected range of variation acceptable to a group, yet 
characterised by neutral copying within this range (Lipo et al. 1997). In this sense, the 
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neutral-copying model helps us objectively identify the groupings of creative expression, 
without resorting to our own subjective opinions as to what “meant” what (Neiman 1995; 
Lipo et al. 1997). 
 
If the copying is neutral, we can predict a lifespan distribution as in Figure 2b, but we 
cannot predicted exactly which new ideas or behaviours will replace the old ones (e.g. 
Salganik et al. 2006). In other words, we can predict the steady production of new 
winners, but the randomness means we can’t forecast the particular winners themselves. 
New ideas can become highly popular by random copying alone, and be replaced over 
time as the next generation of innovations are copied.  
 
The steady turnover under the random copying model (Bentley et al. 2007) could be used 
to predict turnover rates on bestseller lists, for example. How quickly a list will change 
depends on the size of the list – a Top 100 changes proportionally faster than a Top 40 – 
but, surprisingly, the size of the population does not have an impact. Although a larger 
population means more new ideas, it also means more competition to reach the top, and 
the two balance each other out: the turnover on bestseller lists remains steady as 
population size changes. Instead, what actually drives fashion change is innovation – the 
more innovators per capita, the faster the turnover. Innovators are those who ‘pump’ new 
fashions into our world -- most are ignored, but some get copied. Viral marketing 
professionals grasp this, identifying a tiny minority of true innovators among a vast 
majority of copiers. 
 
Looking forward, ours aims for the neutral model are to refine the means of predicting 
change rates, and ways of distinguishing copying from independent decision-making in 
collective behaviour. This evolutionary approach models culture evolution as a process of 
people mainly copying each other, with occasional original invention. For simplicity, this 
copying process can be envisaged along a spectrum ranging from copying others 
completely at random, to selective copying in which the attributes of the behaviours are 
carefully considered. We can then further explore the neutral-copying model with tests of 
the effects of varying generation time, population size, 'memory', invention rate, and 
network structure. We would then be in a position to develop this model through varying 
levels and kinds of independent decision-makers who weigh costs/benefits of their 
options, subject to biases like novelty, validity, or conformity. Ultimately, we seek to 
explore how much we can explain through neutral copying processes before we need to 
resort to ‘reasons’ such as individual selection for one thing or another. The analysis could 
then be used to help identify the scale at which selection is exerted, which could help to 
define the group themselves (Lipo et al. 1997). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Creative expression involves the transmission of information between and among 
individuals, with the continual production of new ideas, a minority of which give rise to 
prominent genres or paradigms. As a science for dynamic systems, cultural evolutionary 
theory (Mesoudi et al. 2006) is ever more useful for a world where this transmission is 
increasingly mediated by online technologies. Chance interactions, novel opportunities, 
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and unforeseen consequences are becoming normal. The pace of adaptation is 
accelerating, as human interaction, which underlies creative productivity, becomes 
compressed though time and space by online technologies that store and disseminate past 
events. Conversations, ideas and relationships, which once were ephemeral, are now 
recorded indefinitely and available to a global audience.  
 
For this reason, it is useful to approach changing cultures not as fixed entities, but as 
“social network markets” (Potts et al. op.cit.) where the division between producers and 
consumers of culture has dissolved. As Potts and his co-authors described, cultural science 
has gained renewed relevance, particularly in new conditions of affluence, 
democratisation, and emancipated consumers amid online networks where identity itself 
is exchangeable. The interaction of people within this “social network economy” creates a 
continual flux of ephemeral communities and novel entrepreneurial opportunities, with 
unforeseen consequences being the norm rather than the exception. 
‘Social network markets’ and other copying models are much more useful than the 
traditional rational actor model of economics to understanding these phenomena. Indeed, 
in such contexts this mode of behaviour can be seen as the appropriate model of 
rationality for agents to adopt. The economic concept of rationality is not general, it is 
merely one possible way of defining rationality. Alternatives are needed in cultural 
science, such as the modes of behaviour described in this paper. 
 
All this motivates a study of creative media past and present, to arrive at an idea of their 
future. Collaboration between cultural studies practitioners and formal modellers is a key 
part of building cultural science. It is easy to fall into the trap of believing that because 
formal modelling requires mathematical skills it is some way superior to more descriptive, 
domain-specific expertise. However, it is not only essential that any mathematical models 
have overall properties which make sense to domain experts, but that any parameters or 
key assumptions made in the models can also be justified in this way. Modelling is a tool 
to take cultural studies forward, and evolutionary theory -- the study of change through 
time through variation, interaction, selection and drift – is an excellent resource for such 
models.  
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